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让路(希望)为5G - Milken Institute评估

【作       者】:

{{d.作者}}

【机       构】: 科技政策研究所
【承研机构】:

【原文地址】: http://www.milkenreview.org/articles/making-way-hopefully-for-5g?IssueID=31
【发表时间】:

2019-05-19

摘要

A Way OutAt the root of the impasse, of course, is the difficulty of giving public agencies appropriate market incentives. Even if an agency had the option of selling the rights to spectrum for which it had little use, it would surely be reluctant to do so because any windfall it gained could easily be taken away in the give-and-take of federal budget reviews.Britain has taken a shot at solving the problem. It instituted a system of “administered incentive pricing” to provide direct incentives for government agencies to use spectrum more efficiently — but, for the aforementioned reason, with ambiguous results.There is, however, another route toward incentive pricing for government-held spectrum that we think holds more promise.Consider first a parallel issue: the way that the federal government manages its vast real estate holdings. The Government Services Administration owns or leases much of the office space that is used by federal agencies. (The Defense Department is the major exception.) In turn, the GSA leases that space to agencies at market-comparable rates. The requirement that they pay rent creates an incentive for the agencies to economize on space and/or location. The GSA, incidentally, can use the rent to acquire additional property if needed without approval from Congress.The GSA model offers a template for how government-held spectrum could be handled. Suppose that all government-used spectrum were “owned” by a central government agency — we call it the Government Spectrum Ownership Corporation, or GSOC — and leased to government users.Under our proposal, the existing users would retain assured access to the spectrum they currently control, but would have to pay for it at rates reflecting its value in private uses. In the first year, the Office of Management and Budget would add a sum to each agency’s budget equal to the rental payment, so the first year’s financial transactions would be a wash.In subsequent years, agency budgets would start from the base that included the initial allocations and rental charges, but the GSOC would adjust the rental rates in light of updated information about the market value of the spectrum. The agencies and OMB would then negotiate budgets (as they do now). But there need not (and should not) be a one-to-one budget adjustment in which agencies automatically get enough cash to cover the fluctuating rent for spectrum. If an agency economized on spectrum usage, it could keep the windfall — perhaps using the money to purchase more modern telecom equipment that uses less spectrum, thereby creating a virtuous circle of sorts.As the agencies economized on spectrum and handed back the surplus, the GSOC would sell or lease the newly created surplus to the private sector. Note that if this surplus were auctioned, the GSOC would receive a bonus in the form of updated information about the private value of spectrum, which it could use to set future charges for government agencies. The same auction platform might also be used by the private sector as a secondary market to buy and sell spectrum.

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